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Introduction:  Long-term  care  (LTC)  is organized  in  a  fragmented  manner.  Payer  agencies  (PA) receive
LTC  funds  from  the  agency  collecting  funds,  and  commission  services.  Yet,  distributional  equity  (DE)
across  PAs,  a precondition  to geographical  equity  of  access  to LTC,  has  received  limited  attention.  We
conceptualize  that  LTC  systems  promote  DE  when  they  are  designed  to set eligibility criteria  nationallyeywords:
ong-term care
quity
unds allocation
ayer agencies
llocation formula
(vs.  locally);  and  to distribute  funds  among  PAs  based  on needs-formula  (vs.  past-budgets  or  government
decisions).
Objectives:  This  cross-country  study  highlights  to what  extent  different  LTC  systems  are designed  to
promote  DE  across  PAs,  and  the parameters  used  in  allocation  formulae.
Methods:  Qualitative  data  were  collected  through  a questionnaire  filled  by experts  from  17  OECD  coun-
tries.
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vamilos990@gmail.com (I. Miloš), jccontel@gencat.cat (J.C. Contel), Liubove.murauskiene@mf.vu.lt (L. Murauskiene), m.kroneman@gmail.com
M. Kroneman), marzena.tambor@uj.edu.pl (M.  Tambor), hrobon@advanceinstitute.cz (P. Hroboň), r.wittenberg@lse.ac.uk (R. Wittenberg), Sara.allin@utoronto.ca (S. Allin),
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Results:  11  out  of 25  LTC  systems  analyzed,  fully  meet  DE  as  we  defined.  5  systems  which  give high
autonomy  to  PAs  have  designs  with  low  levels  of DE; while  nine  systems  partially  promote  DE. Allocation
formulae  vary  in  their  complexity  as  some  systems  use  simple  demographic  parameters  while  others
apply socio-economic  status,  disability,  and  LTC cost variations.
Discussion  and  conclusions:  A  minority  of LTC systems  fully  meet  DE, which  is only  one  of the  criteria  in
allocation  of LTC  resources.  Some  systems  prefer  local  priority-setting  and  governance  over  DE. Countries
that  value  DE  should  harmonize  the  eligibility  criteria  at the  national  level  and  allocate  funds  according
to needs  across  regions.
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. Introduction
Long Term Care (LTC) is a set of services aimed to reduce or man-
ge the deterioration in health status in patients with a degree
f long-term dependency, or to alleviate pain and suffering [1].
t includes personal care, i.e. help with activities of daily living
ADL) such as eating, bathing, washing; social care, i.e. assistance
ervices that enable a person to live independently helping with
nstrumental activities of daily living (IADL) such as shopping,
aundry, cooking; cash allowances to buy the aforementioned ser-
ices, i.e. monetary benefits for people with needs for ADL and/or
ADL; and medical or nursing LTC, e.g. wound dressing, adminis-
ering medication, health counselling, palliative care, pain relief
nd medical diagnosis with relation to a long-term condition [2].
s need for LTC continues to grow, it will represent increasingly
ignificant expenses for health and social care systems in most
igh-income countries, as well as for the older people and their
amilies [3]. Therefore, access to LTC, particularly publicly-funded
TC, is an important public policy topic being dealt with policymak-
rs in many high-income countries. Recent studies have analyzed
ssues of equity in access to and use of LTC of different populations
mong and within European countries [4–8]. From a public policy
erspective, the question of allocation of authority in decision-
aking in health and social care is not trivial, and pops up also in
ebates around centralization versus decentralization of authority
ver laws, money and resources [9].The literature related to the
ublic funding of LTC at the system level deals mainly with col-
ection of funds. For example, studies analyze the various types
f taxation or insurance, their advantages and disadvantages, the
mount and share of public funding, in each country [10,11]. Only
 few studies focus on the allocation of public funds to LTC payer
gencies (PAs) [12,13]. Usually, multiple PAs receive public LTC
unds from a national or local collector of funds, and commission or
urchase LTC services from providers on behalf of recipients [14].
lternatively, PAs provide cash benefits to recipients (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Representation of LTC publicly funded systems and the payer agency.
ource: adapted by authors based on [14].hed  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
In countries with multiple payers, PAs can be local governments or
health/LTC insurance plans, while in countries with a single payer,
the PA can be the central government itself or another agency such
as the national insurance institute. In single payer systems, the
agency that collects funds, usually the central government, is also
the PA, as it commissions services from providers or transfers cash
benefits to recipients directly. PAs, thus, have an important role
in commissioning the LTC services and ensuring their supply for
those in need, according to eligibility, in an equal and efficient way
[15]. We argue that the way  resources are allocated among PAs
and the level of government that sets eligibility criteria is a pre-
condition for equity in access to LTC. Our paper analyzes issues
of equity in resource allocation from a public policy perspective,
and focuses on the PA, rather than the individual, as unit of analy-
sis.
Analyzing “equity” in public policy involves understanding
“who gets what and by what rules”. Several norms or criteria can be
applied to allocate public resources or services among individuals,
populations, regions or PAs. According to Blanchard [16] there are
seven types of ‘fairness’ norms by which public resources or ser-
vices can be allocated: (1) strict equality, everybody gets the same
share of services; (2) need, shares are distributed in proportion to
individuals’ needs; (3) effort or money expended, where shares are
distributed according to the efforts or money people invested for
the public service; (4) results, i.e. shares of services are distributed
in proportion to the results expected for each individual; (5) ascrip-
tion, shares are allocated according to predefined characteristics of
individuals such as age, gender, socioeconomic status; (6) proce-
dure, shares are allocated according to a certain procedure such as
‘first come, first serve’, or lottery; and (7) local demand or prefer-
ence [16]. These norms may  vary among countries depending on
their culture or tradition. We  adopt Daniel’s [17] definition of dis-
tributional equity as the “most desirable distribution of goods and
services in an economy”, choosing the norm of ‘need’ as the most
desirable way to distribute LTC resources among PA. If resources are
distributed according to other criteria, non-needs-related factors
such as socio-economic or demographic criteria may  gain impor-
tance: for instance, the gaps between rich and poor, or young and
old regions may  widen since rich or young areas are in a better
position to collect funds. Yet, regions with a more advantageous
socio-economic structure (e.g. lower share of low-income groups,
younger) also tend to have a lower need for long-term care than
other regions. Pooling resources and redistributing them accord-
ing to ‘need’ may  potentially improve allocation of resources, and
promote equity among regions. Therefore, we  use the term ‘dis-
tributional equity’ referring to LTC system designs that distribute
resources among regions or PA based on need and promote equity
among residents of these regions/PAs. While, we acknowledge that
other norms may  be also used for allocating resources, we pro-
pose in this paper a conceptual framework of ‘distributional equity’
based on need for analyzing LTC systems across countries (Box
1).
R. Waitzberg et al. / Health Pol
Box 1: Terms dictionary
Long-term care (LTC):  set of services aimed to reduce or
manage the deterioration in health status of patients with a
degree of long-term dependency, or to alleviate pain and suffer-
ing [1]. It includes personal care, social care, cash allowances,
and medical or nursing LTC [2]. In this work we excluded med-
ical or nursing LTC from our analysis.
Payer agency (PA): agency that receives public LTC funds
from a national or local collector of funds, and commissions or
purchases LTC services from providers on behalf of recipients.
Eligibility criteria: criteria by which entitlement to publicly-
funded LTC care, and the respective size of the (cash) benefit,
type and amount of (in kind) care, and as such also the basket
of services itself, are determined. Examples of criteria are age,
dependency level, cognitive impairment level, functional dis-
ability. These criteria lead to rules, tools or algorithms used to
assess individuals’ eligibility to LTC.
Horizontal equity: equal treatment of people who have sim-
ilar ‘needs’ for care and support, i.e. equal access to care in
terms of care packages for individuals with the same need.
Distributional equity (DE): payer equity, which means in
many  countries geographical horizontal equity of access to
care services. We  define a LTC system as promoting DE if: (1)
there are national eligibility criteria (not different criteria in dif-
ferent regions) and (2) resources are allocated to PAs based
on need-formula (alternatively if there is a single payer system
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where it is the same agency that collects the funds is the PA)
. Conceptualizing distributional equity in the context of
TC
PAs need to receive the respective funds to commission LTC ser-
ices (yellow arrow in Fig. 1). We  argue that distributional equity
DE) of LTC funding, a precondition to geographical equity of access
of individuals) to LTC, is stronger when two following condi-
ions are met  in the national LTC system design. First, when there
s a common/standardized eligibility criteria, determined at the
ational level rather than being set at a regional level with vari-
nces, or not being defined at all. Eligibility criteria defines the rules
f entitlement to publicly-funded care, and the respective size of
he (cash) benefit, type and amount of care, and services. We  also
rgue that there should be consistent rules to identify individu-
ls in need of LTC, and thus ensure horizontal equity,  defined as
qual treatment for equal need. The second condition of DE is that
unds are distributed in a ‘fair’ manner, it means, using objective and
ransparent criteria that reflect LTC needs: they are redistributed
o PAs according to the needs of the population they serve through
 needs-formula. Distribution of funds according to a (predicted)
eeds-formula alone does not promote DE, if each region/PA com-
issions a different set of services, or does so according to different
ligibility criteria. Therefore, according to our conceptual frame-
ork both conditions should be met  concomitantly in order to
romote DE (Fig. 2).
In our conceptual framework, DE is composed by two elements
f LTC system design. The first relates to eligibility criteria to access
o public-funded LTC, which differs from individual assessment
vertical axis in Fig. 2). Eligibility criteria play an important role
n the analysis of distributional equity, because they represent the
gateway’ or common principles for accessing publicly funded LTC
18]. Need for care, i.e, if an individual has difficulties with personal
r domestic care and would benefit from assistance, is not neces-
arily the same as “need for publicly-paid care”, and it is eligibility
riteria that determines the amounts and types of publicly-funded
ormal care that the individual in need will receive, while the
emaining need is usually complemented by unpaid or privately-
aid care [18,19]. We  assume that to assure horizontal equity, PAsicy 124 (2020) 491–500 493
should commission the same types of care according to needs, i.e.
same eligibility criteria across PAs. This occurs when eligibility cri-
teria are set at the national level, or in systems with a single payer
(top of vertical axis in Fig. 2). When eligibility criteria are set at
the local level or by PAs (bottom of vertical axis), there might be
unwarranted variations in the types and amounts of care commis-
sioned on behalf of individuals with the same need across regions
or PAs, thus hampering DE. Harmonized commissioning of ser-
vices does not necessarily mean commissioning enough quantities
or adequate types of services. Eligibility can be generous or tight
regardless the level that sets it.
The second element of LTC system design that contributes to dis-
tributional equity is the level of concentration and pooling of LTC
funds, and the way funds are allocated to PAs (horizontal axis in
Fig. 2). We  conceptualize that distributional equity is larger when
LTC funds are pooled by central government or agency and real-
located among PAs across regions according to a needs formula
(right side of horizontal axis) or in a single payer system, where the
agency that collects and pools funds is also the PA. The rationale
is that pooling and redistribution of funds enables cross-subsidy
between poor and rich, old and young, or unhealthy and healthy
individuals or areas, which in turn, promotes a fairer distribution
of funds [14]. Relative needs formula to allocate central govern-
ment funds strengthen the link between provision and need [20].
Distribution of funds according to a need formula is also a mecha-
nism to ensure local governments the means to supply uniform care
[21]. The more öbjectiveänd needs-based the distribution of funds,
the fairer it is. We  argue that countries with LTC allocation formu-
las based on needs or risks, have a fairer way of distributing LTC
funds than countries where, for example, past budget is in place,
or where local authorities collect the funds themselves but do not
pool and redistribute (left side of horizontal axis). Using prior uti-
lization and expenditure to allocate funds among PAs is somewhat
arbitrary and may  perpetuate inefficiencies and inequities [20,21].
In systems with competing PAs, past budgets also create incentives
for risk selection against some easily identifiable subgroups [12].
In non-competitive systems, an unequal distribution of funds may
lead to delays or unwanted rationing of care, or unequal increases
in local taxes and user charges, thus hampering equity in access
to care [20]. We  emphasize that a fair allocation of funds does not
mean that LTC systems allocate enough amounts of funds. Fair allo-
cation is not directly related to the generosity of the funds, and there
might be shortages of funds even in a fair allocation system.
DE promotes horizontal equity, with harmonized national eli-
gibility criteria for a given level of need and vertical equity, where
money follows need, and are allocated based on an objective needs-
formula. It is a necessary precondition for equity of access at the
population level, although not sufficient alone. Without DE, two
people with the same level of need, might be eligible to different
types or quantities of care across payers, or these payers might
have a different ability to purchase the care needed. But it is also
important to reduce barriers on the demand side, such as lack of
information, administrative hurdle, complexity of claiming. On the
supply side, variations in the quality of care provided across PAs
may  exist [22,23].
Summarizing, a LTC system is defined to promote DE if:
i) There are national eligibility criteria (not different criteria in
different PAs/ regions) AND
ii) Resources are pooled and reallocated to PAs according to a need-
based formula (alternatively if there is a single payer system
where it is the same agency that collects the funds and is PA)From the conceptual framework above we identify three mod-
els of L̈TC equity design:̈ (1) designs that meet DE (single payer or
need-based allocation of resources and eligibility criteria uniform
494 R. Waitzberg et al. / Health Policy 124 (2020) 491–500
he dim
a
t
f
(
n
3
t
u
t
a
S
D
c
t
u
I
d
t
4
b
H
h
H
b
c
t
f
d
t
h
c
t
a
t
f
c
l
s
b
d
t
o
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework of t
cross country); (2) systems that partially meet DE, i.e. mixed dis-
ribution (systems where either allocation is not based on needs
ormula or eligibility criteria is not set at the national level); and
3) systems that do not meet DE (neither allocation is based on need
or eligibility is unified).
. Objectives
Our study aims to highlight to what extent different LTC sys-
ems are designed to promote DE among PAs, across 25 countries
sing the conceptual framework presented above. We  contribute
o the literature on LTC equity in three main ways. First, we present
 comprehensive cross-country comparison of LTC system designs.
econd, we compare to what extent LTC systems’ design promote
E across PAs: we analyze what level of government sets eligibility
riteria and how countries allocate funds to PAs, focusing on the dis-
ribution formulae. Third, we describe and unpack the parameters
sed by the different countries in their needs-allocation formulae.
t is important to note that we analyze the countries’ LTC system
esign, not the generosity of funds or the contents, amounts or
ypes of care, or how implementation is done in practice.
. Methods
The data and information presented in this paper are collected
y the authors who are experts from the European Observatory’s
ealth Systems and Policy Monitor (HSPM) network (https://www.
spm.org/hspm members.aspx) or are experts on LTC beyond
SPM. In order to collect detailed qualitative data in a compara-
le manner, RW and AES developed a questionnaire based on the
onceptual framework (see supplementary online material).
The questionnaire included all settings of LTC (home, insti-
utions and day care centers) and different types of services
or medical, personal care, social care, and cash allowances. We
ecided to exclude medical or nursing LTC because in most coun-
ries that participated in the study these services are part of the
ealthcare system for which eligibility rules and issues are different
ompared with LTC/social systems. Also there is a broad litera-
ure on this topic in healthcare (pooling and allocation of funds,
nd basket of services and eligibility criteria), thus we  preferred
o focus on non-medical LTC in the current article. Since most LTC
unds are dedicated to older people, we do not examine specific LTC
onditions for disabled young people or children. Finally, as we ana-
yze LTC system designs, we limited our study to publicly funded
ervices or informal care that is reimbursed by the governments.
The experts (co-authors) filled the questionnaire sent by email
etween November 2018 and April 2019, and helped to analyze the
ata. Analysis of the data aimed to describe LTC systems, not coun-
ries, as one country may  have more than one system depending
n where the care is provided and type of care (e.g. institutional vs.ensions of distributional equity.
community care), or type of benefit (in kind vs. cash). LTC-systems
are noted using the criteria defined in our conceptual framework
in order to consolidate models of LTC regarding the level of DE.
Finally, we summarized and analyzed the components of allocation
formulae of the various systems. All the results were reviewed and
crosschecked by the authors in order to enhance trustworthiness.
5. Results
5.1. LTC systems design and the extent to which they promote
distributional equity
Table 1 presents the summary of the data provided by country-
experts about the components and conditions of LTC systems that
compose DE. Regarding eligibility, in 15 out of the 25 LTC sys-
tems analyzed set eligibility criteria at the national level. In Spain,
Canada, the Netherlands, Poland (for community care), and Austria
and Italy (in kind benefits), LTC systems are decentralized, and local
governments (health insurers/plans for the Netherlands) are free
to decide on the eligibility, i.e. the types and amounts of care they
pay for. Norway, Sweden, France, Portugal and England set basic
eligibility criteria at the national level but local governments or
authorities further adjust and redefine it.
Regarding allocation of funds, in most countries, the agency that
collects the funds for LTC is the central government or a combina-
tion of the central with subnational (regional or local) governments.
From our sample, in only in two systems were the majority of
funds collected sub-nationally: Canada and Germany. In Germany,
individuals are assigned an LTC plan associated with the specific
health plan of that individual. German LTC plans collect funds sep-
arately from health plans, but do not compete on members, funds
or services. Funds from LTC plans in Germany are pooled and redis-
tributed retrospectively according to de facto expenses. In Canada,
roughly 77% of the funds are collected by the PA (provinces and ter-
ritories) but these are not pooled nationally. The other 23% come
from federal transfers to the provinces and territories to fund their
healthcare systems. These funds are not earmarked and are not
pooled or redistributed across provinces and territories. In Canada,
the universal health coverage system does not include LTC services,
which are administered and legislated solely at the provincial and
territorial levels. Therefore, there is no mechanism for ensuring dis-
tributional equity across the country in the LTC sector as there is
with hospitals and physician services under the Canada Health Act.
Three out of eighteen LTC systems with multiple payers do not pool
and redistribute funds nationally (Canada, the Netherlands (com-
munity, IADL/day care) and Germany, that has retrospective risk
equalization).
In contrast with the stark dominance of countries where a cen-
tral collector of funds is present, in most systems there are multiple
payers. Only in seven out of the 25 systems there is a single payer
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Table 1
Components of LTC systems that compose design models, by country.
Country What agency sets
eligibility criteria for
the LTC services?
What agency collects
the funds?
What is the PA? Are funds pooled and
redistributed?
How are they
redistributed?
Sources
Austria (cash) Central government Central government Central government N/A [24–27]
Austria  (in kind) Local governments Central government Local governments yes Allocation formula
Canada Regional governments
(provinces)
Regional governments
about 77 %, federal
transfers about 23 %
Regional governments
(provinces and
delegated health
authorities)
no [28–33]
Croatia  (institutional) Central government Central and Local
governments
Central government N/A [34–40]
Croatia  (community) Central government Central government Central government N/A
Cyprus  Central government Central government Central government N/A [41,42]
Czech  Republic (cash) Central government Central government Central government N/A [43,44]
Czech  Republic (in kind) Central government Central government
(85 %) and health plans
(15 %)
Local governments yes Past budget
France  (community) Central government Central (40 %) and Local
governments (60 %)
local government yes (40 %) Allocation formula [45–47]
France  (institutional) Central government Central and Local
governments
local government yes (40 %) Allocation formula
Germany Central government LTC plans,
administered by the
health plans
LTC plans yes expenses (equalization
fund)
[48,49]
Italy  (in kind) Local governments Central and Local
governments
Local governments partially Government decisions
and local authorities
collected funds
[50–55]
Italy  (cash) Central government Central government Central government N/A
Israel  Central government Central government Central government N/A [56,57]
Lithuania  Central government Central government Central and Local
governments
yes Past budget and
formula
[58–66]
the  Netherlands (institutional) Central government Central government Health plans (care
offices)
yes Allocation formula [67–70]
the  Netherlands (community, ADL) District nurses Health plans and
Central governments
Health plans yes Allocation formula
the  Netherlands (community, IADL/day care) Local governments Central government Local governments no
Norway  Local governments Central and local
government
Central and Local
governments
yes Allocation formula [71–74]
Poland  (institutional) Central government Central and local
governments
Local governments Paritally past budet and
government decision
[7576–80]
Poland  (community) Local governments Central and local
governments
Local governments Partially past budget and
government decision
Portugal  Central government Central government Local governments yes Allocation formula [81–84]
Spain  Local governments Central and Local
governments
Local governments yes Automatic updates [85–88]
Sweden  Local governments Central and Local
governments
Local governments yes Allocation formula [89,103,104]
UK  (England) Central and Local
governments
Central and local
governments
Local governments yes Allocation formula [90]
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Fig. 3. Distribution of LTC systems a
here the central government is also the PA (Austria the Czech
epublic and Italy for cash benefits, Cyprus, Croatia institutional
nd community care, and Israel). From the remaining eighteen sys-
ems, ten distribute funds according to a specific LTC needs-based
ormula and the other eight do so based on past budgets, gov-
rnment decisions or a general public-services needs formula. For
xample, In the Netherlands (community, IADL/day care) funds are
ollected at the national level together with funds for other ser-
ices such as education, and are distributed over the municipalities
ccording to an allocation formula that includes, among other crite-
ia, expected need for LTC. However, since funds are not earmarked,
nce funds are allocated, municipalities can spend the budget as
hey like (although they have a statutory task to provide iADL care).
ome municipalities overspend the allocated budget, whereas oth-
rs underspend, thus leading to variations in the budget available
elative to the existing needs. Fig. 3 presents the countries in our
ample distributed among the LTC models.
The detailed models are as follows:
I Systems that meet DE
1 Eligibility set nationally, Funds collected nationally, single
payer: Austria (cash benefits), Croatia (institutional and com-
munity), Cyprus, Czech Republic (cash benefits), Israel, Italy
(cash benefits)
2  Eligibility set nationally, Funds pooled, and redistributed to
multiple payers based on needs-formula: Germany, Lithuania,
the Netherlands (institutional care), Portugal
II Systems that partially meet DE
1 Eligibility set nationally, Funds collected locally, not pooled
(no redistribution): Italy (cash benefits), France (40 % pooled
and redistributed based on need formula, the rest is locally
collected), Poland (institutional care)
2 Eligibility set nationally, Funds collected centrally, and redis-
tributed based on past budget: Czech Republic (in kind
benefits)
3 Eligibility set locally, Funds pooled, and redistributed to multi-
ple payers based on needs-formula: Austria (in kind benefits),
England, the Netherlands (IADL, day care, ADL), Norway,
Sweden
II Systems that do not meet DE
1 Eligibility set locally, Funds pooled and redistributed based
on past budgets or government decision: Poland (care in the
community)
2 Eligibility set locally, Funds collected locally, not pooled
(no redistribution): Canada, Italy (in kind benefits), The
Netherlands (community IADL care), Spaining to the models of system design.
5.2. Allocation needs-formulas and parameters
Roughly half of the systems with multiple payers allocate
resources among payers based on a LTC needs-formula (France –
40 %, Lithuania, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Germany, England, the
Netherlands for institutional care and community ADL care, Austria
for in kind benefits; Czech Republic does that for 15 % of its budget)
(see Table 2). Sweden and Norway apply demographic parameters
such as marital status, in order to reflect existence of alternative
informal care. They also consider spoken language and residence
in sparsely populated areas, in order to reflect special caregiver
needs. A few countries developed formulas that take into con-
sideration further risk adjusters such as disability or dependency
level or chronic diseases (the Netherlands, England) and/or previ-
ous years’ expenditures (Austria, France, Norway). France further
consider socioeconomic parameters such as number of allowance
claimants and income of elderly in the region under responsibility
of the local authority. In England, the needs-based allocation for-
mulae take account of differences between areas in wage rates, in
order to recognise differences in the costs of care driven by factors
outside the control of payers (local authorities) and providers. In
Germany, although funds are pooled from LTC funds, reallocation
occurs only retrospectively according to de facto expenditures. For
the detailed formulas of each country see online supplementary
material.
6. Discussion
In this paper we  propose a conceptual framework where DE pro-
motes both horizontal equity, with harmonized national eligibility
criteria; and vertical equity, as funds are allocated based on objec-
tive needs-formulas. We  argue that DE is a necessary precondition
for equity of access at the population level, although not sufficient
alone, as in implementation there could be gaps or inconsistencies
[7,8]. We  analyzed features of 25 LTC systems design in 17 countries
to understand to what extent they promote DE of resources from
a system design perspective. According to our conceptual frame-
work, 11 systems are characterized by a design that meet DE, i.e.
eligibility is set at the national level and allocation of funds among
PAs is based on a needs-formula, or there is a single payer. In five
systems, the design does not promote DE across PA, these are usu-
ally federal or decentralized systems, which give autonomy to PAs.
Finally, in another nine systems the system partially promotes DE.
Usually institutional care designs meet more DE than community
care. In kind benefits are usually designed partially meeting DE,
while cash benefits usually meet DE. We found that in roughly half
of the LTC systems with multiple payers, funds are allocated accord-
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Table  2
Parameters used for distributing pooled funds by country*.
Demographic (age, gender,
marital status, household
composition)
Socio-economic (income,
education, allowance
claimants)
Health/ disability condition
(number of ADL limitations,
chronic conditions, level of
help needed)
LTC costs (previous year, and
expected)
Austria (in kind) x
Czech Republic (15 %) x x
France x x x
Germany x
Lithuania x
the Netherlands (institutional) x
the Netherlands (community) x x x
Norway x x x
Sweden x
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*) Note: data from Portugal was not available.
ng to a needs-formula and the other half is either not pooled, or
ooled and redistributed according to past budgets or government
ecisions. Some of the allocation formulae were simple, and might
iss factors that influence the risk of needing LTC. For example,
xcept Sweden, LTC systems do not adjust their formulae for ethnic-
ty, or for type of impairment such as cognitive, physical functions,
eurological diseases. While for healthcare there is a vast literature
n risk adjustment allocation formulas and mechanisms [91,92,20],
or LTC, literature is scarce [93]. The complexity of LTC systems and
he difficulty of prediction of future costs of LTC might create bar-
iers for a fair distribution of funds based on need. Alternatively,
llocation of resources to payers is a part of LTC system designs
hat has not received enough attention yet or it is believed that the
isk of needing LTC is more homogeneously distributed compared
o acute care. What is sure is that risk adjustment for many settings
f LTC is still immature [94].
DE in LTC has, for some time, been of concern to policy-makers
nd researchers alike, especially as public resources are scarce
nd demand for LTC is bound to increase [95]. Regional differ-
nces, sometimes coined as the problem of ‘postcode lottery’ [96],
rise in LTC as this field of public policy has emerged from social
are, in most countries is under the responsibility of local govern-
ents [97]. Regional differences can point to limited horizontal
quity in access. To our knowledge, few comprehensive empiri-
al analyses exist hitherto on how LTC resource allocation design
iverges regionally, and how such differences might be tied to the
echanisms underlying LTC fund allocation and harmonization of
ligibility criteria across countries. Fernandez and Forder [98] iden-
ified regional variances in social care per capita expenditure across
nglish local authorities. They mention that part of this variation
ay  be due to different regional supply conditions such as dif-
erent quality or costs of providers or different capacity to raise
ocal revenue due to variations in the population wealth in the
ifferent regions. In a recent study, Gori and Morciano [99] com-
are how cash-for-care benefits vary in coverage, policy mix  and
enerosity in 6 European countries over time, but their study does
ot relate to in-kind benefits nor to a broad range of OECD coun-
ries. Two different recent trends in LTC system designs may affect
he role of PAs and the need of allocation mechanisms in opposite
irections. The first, is that organization and regulation of care is
ncreasingly being decentralized and passed on to local authorities,
ased on the assumption that, if the provision of care is organized
lose to the recipient, this will lead to more appropriate care solu-
ions [10,13,100,101]. In this case, Pas’ role may  increase, and so
ay  the need of an accurate and transparent needs-formula. The
econd trend is the shift from in-kind to cash benefits in order to
romote flexibility for recipients in the way and type of care of
heir preference [99,101]. The tendency is to skip PAs and transfer
unds directly from central governments to the recipients throughx x
personal budgets. Examples are Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic.
If this trend continues, allocation of resources is likely to change,
and the role of the PA might decrease.
In this work we  assumed that DE is a main objective of resource
allocation for LTC and that the norm to distribute resources should
be ‘need’. However, DE might not always be the objective of a LTC
system, as some systems regard more local utilities, i.e. the extent
to which localities value and prioritize LTC, and prefer providing
local authorities with autonomy and flexibility to set or adapt eli-
gibility criteria and how to spend their money. As we described in
the introduction, there can be various norms through which public
policy resources can be distributed [16]. In these systems, the norm
chosen to distribute resources might be ‘preference’. For example,
in a locality people might value more education than LTC, or within
LTC, prefer informal care, or prefer institutional care or have other
alternatives, than in another locality. There is a tension between
DE and local preferences and utility, and systems that choose local
utility do not allocate funds based on a formula necessarily, but
consider local preferences and priorities [97]. We  identify a trade-
off between local utility and DE: while local utility favors choice,
priority setting and cost consciousness at the local level, it may
lead to regional variation in access and quality of LTC services due
to variation in local income and priorities. Similarly, DE may  reduce
regional variation at the expense of local priority-setting and cost
control [102].
6.1. Limitations
LTC systems are complex and, in our attempt to classify each
country into a model, we could not analyze every LTC component
or type of care in detail. In other instances, countries’ systems may
not fit the categories we  use in their entirety. For example, the dif-
ferent nuances of services for ADL and IADL, or the extent to which
eligibility criteria is objective or can vary by evaluation agent. How-
ever, the advantages of observing various countries’ experiences in
a cross-country comparison outweigh the disadvantages of losing
each country’s details. Another limitation of this study is that data
was collected based on researchers’ knowledge, policy documents
and literature. However, sometimes detailed data is not available,
for example, the exact distribution need-formulas. The absence of
documentation on needs-based formula is, in and of itself, valuable
information on the importance of equity in the system, which has
been overlooked by policy makers. Public policy is not always trans-
parent or done in a methodical manner, and this works attempts
to unpack part of the LTC policy-making, which is one of the most
relevant nowadays. Finally, this work analyses LTC systems design,
therefore, it cannot tell if implementation of the system is indeed
homogeneous or if it succeeds in ensuring equal commissioning of
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are across payers in practice. However, analyzing it was beyond
he scope of this work.
. Conclusions
Two thirds of LTC systems set eligibility criteria at the national
evel, and one third prefer local governments to determine eligibil-
ty according to their own discretion. Most LTC systems delegate
ommissioning of LTC to local PAs, but only half allocate funds
mong them according to a needs-formula. Allocation formulas
sed are often simple and deserve further attention in order to
romote DE. Policy makers should pay attention to the extent to
hich allocation formulas reflect expected care risks and needs and
istribute funds in a fair manner, especially as more countries are
onsidering moving towards a system of LTC social insurance.
Distributional equity is one of the objectives of the LTC systems.
TC systems meeting distributional equity are not forcibly those
etter performing, since local decision making has its advantages.
his paper proposes one way of classifying LTC systems based on
eed for provoking reflection and further research on the equity of
TC systems. In particular, future work is needed in order to ana-
yze the link between LTC system design and outcomes in terms of
ccess, quality and DE.
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valomojo sveikatos draudimo fondo biudžeto lėšų Planavimo ir paskirstymo
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